Lessons From Avena: The Inadequacy of Clemency and Judicial Proceedings for Violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations by Carter, Linda E.
CARTER.DOC 9/15/2005  10:07 AM 
 
259 
LESSONS FROM AVENA: THE  
INADEQUACY OF CLEMENCY AND JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE 
VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR 
RELATIONS 
LINDA E. CARTER* 
The vindication of rights guaranteed by the Constitution has never 
been made to turn on the unreviewable discretion of an executive of-
ficial or administrative tribunal.1 
Applying the procedural default rule to article 36 claims is not only 
in direct violation of the Vienna Convention, but it is also manifestly 
unfair.2 
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 1. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 440 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 2. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 919, 919 (2003) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are presently 118 death row inmates in the United States 
who are citizens of other countries.3  They represent 31 different na-
tionalities and are incarcerated in 16 states and a federal peniten-
tiary.4  It is likely that most of the 118 death row inmates had a right 
to be told that they could contact the consulate of their home country 
pursuant to a multilateral treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations (VCCR).5  It is also likely that their consular notification 
rights were violated and that the consulates were unaware that one of 
their citizens was charged with a serious offense.6  Many of these indi-
viduals have argued in court and in clemency that the violation of 
their consular notification right under the VCCR adversely affected 
the fairness of the criminal proceedings.7 
The capital cases involving foreign nationals and the consular no-
tification treaty bring into focus the troubling confluence of the illu-
sory nature of clemency and the limitations of federal habeas corpus.  
The inadequacy of post-conviction proceedings in the United States 
became acutely apparent when the violations of the VCCR were liti-
gated in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in two recent cases.  
This essay explores why both clemency and the legal process fail to 
satisfy the treaty's requirements for the consular notification right.  
Clemency understandably fails to provide the protection needed, 
should not be relied upon for any guaranteed right, and should not be 
 
 3. Foreign Nationals and the Death Penalty in the United States, Death Penalty 
Information Center, Nov. 28, 2004 [hereinafter DPIC], at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org./article.php?did=198&scid=31 (last visited May 28, 2005). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 
261.  Over 160 countries are signatories to the VCCR.  See id. 
 6. DPIC, supra note 3, Reported Foreign Nationals Under Sentence of Death in the 
U.S.(indicating that only three of the foreign nationals on death row were timely notified of the 
right to contact their consul). 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 391 (6th Cir. 2001) (summarizing 
the response of courts to the VCCR, which has typically involved avoiding the issue whether the 
treaty conveys individual rights and rejecting remedies of suppression or dismissal).  See also 
Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights to Consular Notification and Access in the United 
States: What's Changed Since the LaGrand Case?, 25 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (2002) (discussing the 
response of courts to VCCR claims after LaGrand). 
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significantly revised in an effort to improve compliance with the 
VCCR.  The legal process, however, inexcusably fails to provide ade-
quate protection for the right, should be relied upon to provide a fo-
rum to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and should be reformed to 
meet this need.  Legal reforms are most likely to occur either through 
judicial decisions or through legislative action, although executive ac-
tion is also an avenue.  The possibility of the United States Supreme 
Court resolving the compliance issue in a case in which it has recently 
granted certiorari is discussed.  In addition, a recent Presidential 
memorandum that has surfaced in the case before the Supreme Court 
and that directs compliance with the Avena decision is described. 
Both judicial and executive means of compliance with the treaty obli-
gation are desirable and complementary to each other and to legisla-
tive reform.  This article suggests that, in addition to any judicial or 
executive measures, legislative action is also needed.  Congress 
should take the initiative to pass an amendment to the federal habeas 
corpus statute that would permit a hearing when required by a treaty 
or other law even when the issue would otherwise be barred under 
habeas rules.  As presently conducted, there is too great a likelihood 
that a VCCR claim will not be heard in a U.S. court, in violation of 
the treaty.  There is an urgent need for legal reform, and legislative 
reform can provide the most comprehensive approach. 
II.  THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON  
CONSULAR RELATIONS AND CAPITAL CASES 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) is not a 
recent treaty.  It opened for signatures in 1963 and was entered into 
force for the United States in 1969.8  Currently, over 160 countries are 
parties to the treaty.  The right to consular information and notifica-
tion was not litigated in criminal cases in U.S. courts, however, until 
the mid-1990s.  The treaty provides in pertinent part: 
With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relat-
ing to nations of the sending state . . . if he so requests, the compe-
tent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform 
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, 
a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to cus-
tody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.  Any com-
munication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, 
in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said 
 
 8. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 5, at 21 U.S.T. at 77. 
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authorities without delay.  The said authorities shall inform the per-
son concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.9 
The treaty's notification requirement means that any foreign na-
tional in the United States who is detained, and whose country is a 
party to this treaty, has a right to be told in a timely manner that he or 
she can contact the consulate of his or her home country.  Routinely 
violated in the United States, the consular notification right came to 
the fore in capital cases beginning with a Canadian national who was 
convicted and sentenced in Texas.10 
The VCCR is an important treaty for foreign nationals accused 
of capital or noncapital crimes in the United States.  Consular assis-
tance may include humanitarian efforts, such as notifying family 
members of the defendant's location.11  The assistance may also in-
clude legal efforts, such as obtaining counsel to represent the defen-
dant, assisting counsel with locating witnesses and documents in the 
home country, filing amicus briefs, negotiating with the prosecutor, 
and perhaps, most importantly, explaining the differences and conse-
quences of actions in the two legal systems.12 
III.  INTERPRETATION OF THE CONVENTION:  
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
Paraguay, Germany, and Mexico have all pursued violations of 
the VCCR in U.S. courts and by taking a case to the ICJ.  In the 
 
 9. Id. at 21 U.S.T. at 100–01, 596 U.N.T.S. at 292–93 (emphasis added). 
 10. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996).  When the Canadian authorities 
became aware of Faulder's case, extensive efforts were made on both diplomatic and legal levels 
to spare his life.  Texas, however, proceeded with the execution in 1999.  See Harold Hongju 
Koh, Paying "Decent Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1085, 1114–15 (2002). 
 11. See, e.g., Mark Warren, Consular Notification and Assistance: A Guide for Defense At-
torneys, Sept. 2004, HUMAN RIGHTS RESEARCH (providing a summary of possible assistance, 
humanitarian, protective, and legal), at http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/attorneys.htm (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2005).  See also Michael Fleishman, Note, "Reciprocity Unmasked: The Role of 
the Mexican Government in Defense of its Foreign Nationals in United States Death Penalty 
Cases,  20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 359 (2003) (discussing various cases of Mexicans and inter-
action with their consular officers). 
 12. This flaw proved fatal for Angel Breard, who did not appear to understand the signifi-
cance of a plea offer and the consequences of going to trial.  He rejected a plea offer to life im-
prisonment, went to trial and confessed on the stand, and was sentenced to death.  See discus-
sion of consular assistance and Breard's case in John Cary Sims & Linda E. Carter, Representing 
Foreign Nationals: Emerging Importance of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations as a 
Defense Tool, THE CHAMPION, Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 28.  See also Bishop, supra note 7, at 16–27 
(outlining the Breard case). 
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Breard13 (Paraguay) and LaGrand14 (Germany) cases, the defendants 
were tried, convicted of murder, and sentenced to death without the 
required consular notification.  All avenues of review in U.S. courts, 
including federal habeas, civil lawsuits against the state involved, and 
the seeking of original jurisdiction in the U.S. Supreme Court were 
exhausted, without achieving any consideration of the VCCR viola-
tion on the merits.  Clemency was also exhausted.  Ultimately, both 
Paraguay and Germany obtained provisional measures from the ICJ, 
indicating that the United States should take all measures at its dis-
posal to prevent the executions until the ICJ could hear the cases on 
the merits.15  In each case, the defendants were executed prior to any 
further ICJ proceedings.16  Although Paraguay did not pursue its 
claim in the ICJ, Germany continued and obtained a decision in its 
favor on the merits.17  In the third case, Avena, Mexico sought relief 
in the ICJ on behalf of all 52 Mexican nationals on death row in nine 
different states.18  Because the individual defendants were at different 
stages of post-conviction proceedings, some were closer to having 
execution dates than others.  Once again, the ICJ issued provisional 
measures, indicating that the United States must take all measures at 
its disposal to prevent the execution of three of the Mexican nationals 
who were the closest to having executions pending.  None were exe-
cuted prior to the recent decision on the merits in favor of Mexico.19 
In the two cases in which the ICJ reached a decision on the mer-
its, the Court interpreted the VCCR to require a meaningful recogni-
 
 13. Breard v Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
 14. F.R.G. v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999). 
 15. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Apr. 9) 
(order of provisional measures); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9 (Mar. 3) (order of pro-
visional measures). 
 16. Angel Breard, the Paraguayan citizen, was executed a few days after the ICJ order of 
provisional measures of Apr. 9, 1998.  Germany's case was on behalf of two brothers, Walter 
and Karl LaGrand.  One of  the LaGrand brothers was executed before and the other after the 
ICJ order of provisional measures of Mar. 3, 1999. See Foreign Nationals Executed Since 1976, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org./article.php? 
scid=31&did=582#executed  (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
 17. LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 514 (June 27). 
 18. Application Instituting Proceedings (Mex. v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. (Avena) No 128, at 18 
(Jan. 9), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusorder/imus_iapplication_ 
20030109.PDF.  The suit started for 54 Mexicans in 10 states but was reduced to 52 Mexican 
nationals in 9 states.  Id. 
 19. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. No 128 (Mar. 31), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus_imusjudgment_ 
20040331.pdf (last visited Feb. 19. 2005). 
CARTER.DOC 9/15/2005  10:07 AM 
264 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 15:259 
tion of the rights under the treaty.20  In the first case, LaGrand, the 
ICJ found that the treaty requires that the United States "allow the 
review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking 
account of the violation of the rights set forth in [the VCCR]."21  The 
ICJ further found that the United States could comply with the re-
view and reconsideration "by means of its own choosing."22 
The United States chose to rely on clemency and the usual judi-
cial processes that could result in a refusal to consider the issue.23  In 
the second case, Avena, Mexico challenged these choices, arguing that 
the treaty required judicial consideration of the violation.24  The ICJ 
agreed with Mexico in the Avena case.  The Court emphasized that a 
review and reconsideration should "guarantee that the violation and 
the possible prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined 
and taken into account in the review and reconsideration process."25  
The ICJ stated that the "legal consequences of this breach have to be 
examined and taken into account" and that "[t]he Court considers 
that it is the judicial process that is suited to this task."26  The ICJ also 
reaffirmed its prior finding in LaGrand that a judicial process that 
precluded the consideration of the VCCR issue is inadequate.  The 
United States is not giving full effect to the rights under the treaty if a 
procedural device, such as procedural default in habeas corpus, pre-
cludes the consideration of the VCCR violation.27 
 
 20. By signing an Optional Protocol, the United States had agreed to the jurisdiction of the 
ICJ for matters concerning the interpretation or application of the VCCR.  Optional Protocol 
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, art. I, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596 
U.N.T.S. 487.  In a surprising development, the United States withdrew from the Optional 
Protocol on March 7, 2005.  Announcement: All Consular Notification Requirement Remain in 
Effect, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, available at http://travel.state.gov/news/news_2155.html# (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2005).  See report of the withdrawal in U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, 
WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 10, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ 
articles/A21981-2005Mar9.html?. 
 21. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514.  For an excellent discussion of the significance of the re-
view and reconsideration finding, see Christian J. Tams, Consular Assistance and Rights and 
Remedies: Comments on the ICJ's Judgment in the LaGrand Case, 13 EUR. J. INT'L. L.1257 
(2002). 
 22. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 514. 
 23. Avena, Counter-Memorial of the United States (Mex. v. U.S.),paras. 6.63–6.78 (Nov. 3, 
2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus_ipleadings_ 
20031103_c-mem_06.pdf (last visited Feb. 19 2005). 
 24. Avena, Memorial of Mexico (Mex. U.S.), paras. 280–282 (June 20, 2003), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus_ipleadings_20030620_memorial_ 
04.pdf (last visited Feb. 19 2005). 
 25. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. No 128, at para. 138. 
 26. Id. at para. 140. 
 27. Id. at para. 113. 
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The ICJ's concerns with the adequacy of clemency and the pre-
clusionary effect of procedural default within the framework of the 
VCCR violations are indicative of a problem in post-conviction pro-
ceedings in the American criminal justice system.  The nature of 
clemency is important to an understanding of why clemency cannot 
be a vehicle for a review and reconsideration.  Moreover, the limited 
use, and inconsistent use, of clemency in practice confirms the inabil-
ity of clemency to serve as an effective means to consider the effect of 
a VCCR violation on the criminal proceedings.  Federal habeas cor-
pus proceedings, as presently constituted, also cannot adequately 
serve the function of a review and reconsideration.  Procedural de-
fault and other aspects of federal habeas corpus that preclude consid-
eration of the VCCR issue bar effective review.  It is, thus, important 
to consider both clemency and habeas before turning to possible legal 
reforms. 
IV.  WHY IS CLEMENCY INADEQUATE TO  
CONSIDER THE EFFECT OF VCCR VIOLATIONS? 
In the 1992 case of Herrera v. Collins,28 Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
"Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, 
and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where 
judicial process has been exhausted."29  In Avena, the United States 
used this theory to argue that clemency procedures satisfied the re-
quirement under the VCCR for a "review and reconsideration" of the 
conviction and sentence when there was a violation of the consular 
notification right.30  The United States contended that clemency is 
"part of the overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the le-
gal process"31  The ICJ, however, rejected clemency as an adequate 
review and reconsideration.  The ICJ stated that its interpretation of 
the VCCR in LaGrand, requiring a review and reconsideration, was 
premised on the idea "that the process of review and reconsideration 
should occur within the overall judicial proceedings. . ."32  The heart 
of the requirement was an effective means to review and reconsider 
the conviction and sentence.33  The ICJ is certainly correct in its as-
 
 28. 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 
 29. Id. at 411–12. 
 30. Avena, U.S. Memorial, supra note 23, at 6.67–6.68. 
 31. Avena, 2004 I.C.J. No 128, at para. 136. 
 32. Id. at para. 141 (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at para. 142.  The Court stated: 
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sessment of clemency in the United States.  The position of the 
United States reflects a misunderstanding or misuse of clemency.  
Why is it, though, that the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages 
of justice fails to provide an effective review and reconsideration of 
the consular notification issue?  The answer to this question lies in the 
nature of clemency and its application. 
Clemency historically,34 and to this day in the United States, is 
vested in the executive.  For federal prosecutions, the clemency 
power is vested in the President.35  For state prosecutions, the precise 
mechanism varies, but the authority rests with the executive branch of 
the state.  In many states in the United States, the governor has the 
authority to grant clemency, which includes a pardon, a commutation 
of a sentence, and a reprieve.  In some states, the power to grant 
clemency is vested in an appointed board.  In other states, the clem-
ency power is dependent on a combined judgment of executive deci-
sion-makers, such as where the governor grants or denies clemency, 
but may only grant it upon the recommendation of a majority of a 
board of pardons and paroles.36 
The judiciary in the United States has taken a "hands-off" ap-
proach to clemency.  There is virtually no judicial oversight of the ex-
ecutive's grant or denial of clemency.  In a 1998 opinion, a splintered 
majority of the United States Supreme Court found that there were 
"some minimal procedural safeguards" of due process in a clemency 
 
The Court accepts that executive clemency, while not judicial, is an integral part of the 
overall scheme for ensuring justice and fairness in the legal process within the United 
States criminal justice system.  It must, however, point out that what is at issue in the 
present case is not whether executive clemency as an institution is or is not an integral 
part of the "existing laws and regulations of the United States", but whether the clem-
ency process as practiced within the criminal justice systems of different states in the 
United States can, in and of itself, qualify as an appropriate means for undertaking the 
effective "review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account 
of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention", as the Court prescribed in 
the LaGrand  Judgment.  Id. 
 34. See discussion of the history of clemency in Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy 
Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569 (1991); James R. 
Acker & Charles S. Lanier, May God—Or the Governor—Have Mercy: Executive Clemency and 
Executions in Modern Death-Penalty Systems, 36 CRIM L. BULL. 200 (2000). 
 35. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. 
 36. See Clemency Process by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org./article.php?did=126&scid=13#process (last visited Feb. 19, 
2005) for up-to-date information on the process used in individual states.  For those states with a 
combination of a board recommendation and action by the governor, there are different mod-
els.  Id.  In nine states, the governor must have the recommendation of a board to grant clem-
ency; in nine other states, there is a nonbinding recommendation from a board; and in three 
states, the governor sits as a member of a board that decides clemency issues.  Id. 
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proceeding in a capital case.37  The examples given indicate that this 
minimal level is indeed low.  Writing a concurrence, which was joined 
by three other justices, Justice O'Connor gave examples of flipping a 
coin or arbitrarily denying access to a clemency proceeding as a de-
nial of due process.38  She concurred in the case before the Court, 
which found that Ohio had provided sufficient due process.39  In sub-
sequent cases, lower courts in the United States have repeatedly 
found no due process violation in clemency procedures.40 
With the only oversight of clemency resting with voters who elect 
the governors,41 it is not surprising that there is neither consistency 
nor standardized reasons for granting or denying clemency.  The 
VCCR cases exemplify the unpredictability and unreliability of clem-
ency.  Osvaldo Torres was recently granted a commutation by the 
governor of Oklahoma, in part on the basis of the VCCR violation in 
his case.42  Earlier in 2004, however, Hung Thanh Le was denied 
clemency in the same state despite raising a VCCR claim.43  Similarly, 
Javier Suarez Medina was executed in Texas in 2002 despite the pro-
test of Mexican President Vicente Fox over a VCCR violation.44  
 
 37. Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 38. Id.  The fifth vote for a due process right was provided by Justice Stevens, who wrote 
separately. 
 39. Ohio's process involved a hearing by a parole board that recommended a result to the 
governor, who then decided whether or not to grant clemency.  Id. at 276.  The defendant was 
told on three-days notice that he could have a prehearing interview.  Id. at 289.  The defendant's 
attorney could not be present at the interview; nor could the defendant submit evidence to the 
board.  Id. at 289.  This procedure satisfied the minimal due process standards.  Id. at 290. 
 40. See cases collected in LINDA E. CARTER & ELLEN KREITZBERG, UNDERSTANDING 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT LAW 260–62 (Lexis 2004).  The Faulder case, involving a VCCR viola-
tion in a capital case of a Canadian national, is an example of how minimal the due process 
needs to be.  In Faulder's case, the Board failed to hold hearings, provided no reasons, and kept 
no records.  The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no due process violation.  Faulder v. 
Texas Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 178 F.3d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 41. For further discussion of the effect of politics inhibiting the grant of clemency, see 
Cathleen Burnett, The Failed Failsafe: The Politics of Executive Clemency, 8 TEX. F.  ON C.L. & 
C.R. 191 (2003).  See also Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, On Lawful Lawlessness: George 
Ryan, Executive Clemency, and the Rhetoric of Sparing Life, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1307 (2004) (ex-
ploring the unusual nature of clemency and its uneasy relationship with judicial processes). 
 42. Clemency, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org./ 
article.php?did=126&scid=13 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
 43. Despite a recommendation of clemency by the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, 
and a 30-day stay by the governor, clemency was denied and Le was executed in March 2004.  
Foreign Nationals Executed Since 1976, supra note 16. 
 44. Current Issues and News about Foreign Nationals, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org./article.php?scid=31&did=579 (last visited Feb. 19, 2005). 
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Since 1976, 21 foreign nationals have been executed in the United 
States, six granted commuted sentences, and three released on the ba-
sis of innocence.45  It is probable that in none of the cases involving 
foreign nationals, whether executed, commuted, or released, was the 
VCCR observed in a timely manner. 
On a more general level, cases involving juveniles and inmates 
with mental retardation further illustrate how inconsistently clemency 
is granted.  For example, in 2003, an inmate who was a juvenile at the 
time of the crime was executed in Oklahoma whereas an inmate in 
Kentucky was granted clemency because he was a juvenile at the time 
of the crime.46  In a recent article, Professor Rapaport documents 
clemency grants to nine death row inmates because they were juve-
niles, mentally retarded, or mentally ill during the period from 1977 
to 2002.47  During the same period of time, it is estimated that twenty-
one juveniles and thirty-four mentally retarded death row inmates 
were executed.48 
Perhaps the greatest discrepancy in the exercise of discretion is 
the contrast between Illinois and California.  In 2003, Governor Ryan 
of Illinois commuted the sentences of all 167 inmates on death row in 
that state.49  In California, with over 600 death row inmates and the 
largest death row in the United States, no death sentence has been 
commuted since the reinstatement of constitutional capital punish-
ment statutes in 1976.50 
Moreover, the rarity of clemency in and of itself negates any reli-
ance on it.  Since the reinstatement of capital punishment in the 
United States in 1976, clemency has been granted in 228 cases, 167 of 
 
 45. Foreign Nationals, Part III, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at 
http://deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=583#innocence (last visited Apr. 18, 2005). 
 46. Execution of Juveniles in the U.S., DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=27&did=203#execsus; Clemency, supra note 
42.  The execution of defendants who were juveniles at the time of their crimes was recently 
held unconstitutional in Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
 47. Elizabeth Rapaport, Straight is the Gate: Capital Clemency in the United States from 
Gregg to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REV. 349, 354 (2003). 
 48. Id.  Professor Rapaport points out that it is difficult to know the number of mentally ill 
inmates who have been executed, but the number may well be higher than for those inmates 
with mental retardation.  Id. 
 49. See articles cited in Carter & Kreitzberg, supra note 40, at 253.  Of those 167, 164 sen-
tences were commuted to life imprisonment and 3 were commuted to 40 years.  Id. at 253 n.1. 
 50. Neal Walker, Executive Clemency and the Death Penalty, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 266, 267-
68 (1994) (indicating no commutations in California in last 20 years); State by State Information, 
DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/state/ (last visited Apr. 15, 
2005)(indicating 0 commutations in California since 1976). 
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which were the blanket grant in Illinois.51  During the same period of 
time, 960 executions have taken place,52 and there are presently over 
3,400 persons on death row in the United States.53  Clemency is rou-
tinely denied in most states in capital cases. 
Despite the inconsistency and unreliability of clemency as a 
mechanism to correct miscarriages of justice, clemency serves impor-
tant purposes in the criminal justice system and should not be 
changed.  Clemency is an "act of mercy"54 and, as such, is a final safe-
guard if exercised.  Clemency may also serve to correct an unjust re-
sult in legal proceedings.  Professor Rapaport has pointed out that 
clemency additionally serves an important function as an "incubator 
and laboratory for defenses and mitigation" that are not yet recog-
nized in legal doctrines.55  As an unregulated, unreviewable process, 
clemency may, in fact, at times correct an injustice in the system, ei-
ther on the basis of innocence, procedural unfairness, or an unjust re-
sult.  An unfettered power to grant clemency, despite its irregularity, 
is a tool in preventing miscarriages of justice. 
The proper roles of clemency, however, must be kept in perspec-
tive, and clemency must not be the primary vehicle for post-
conviction review.  Although there are a number of thoughtful pro-
posals for greater regulation of clemency with standards and judicial 
oversight,56 it is unlikely that this will occur in the near future on a na-
tionwide basis.  Clemency should not be relied upon, as the United 
States did in Avena, as an effective means of guaranteeing a hearing 
on a legal right.  In contrast to the unregulated clemency process, we 
 
 51. Clemency, supra note 42. 
 52. Executions by Year, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at http://www.deathpenalty 
info.org/article.php?scid=8&did=146 (last  updated Apr. 21, 2005). 
 53. Death Row Inmates by States, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=9&did=188#state (last visited Apr. 15, 2005). 
 54. The meaning of "mercy" itself is complex.  For a discussion of many facets of what is 
meant by mercy and its implications in the recent symposium in the North Carolina Law Review 
see, inter alia, Stephen P. Garvey, Is It Wrong to Commute Death Row?  Retribution, Atonement, 
and Mercy, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1319 (2004); Austin Sarat, Putting a Square Peg in a Round Hole: 
Victims, Retribution, and George Ryan's Clemency, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1345, 1348 (2004); Robert 
Weisberg, Apology, Legislation, and Mercy, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1415 (2004). 
 55. Rapaport, supra note 47, at 372. 
 56. See, e.g., Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy: The Supreme Court's Reliance on Com-
mutation to Ensure Justice in Death Penalty Cases, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311 (1996); Alyson 
Dinsmore, Clemency in Capital Cases: The Need to Ensure Meaningful Review, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1825 (2002); Stephen Saltzburg, Justice Kennedy Commission Report, Adopted by the 
House of Delegates, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AUGUST 9–10, 2004, (recommending that 
states establish standards and procedures for executive clemency), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/121C.doc. 
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expect standards, procedures, and review in the judicial system.  Con-
sequently, a post-conviction process falls within the purview of the 
judicial and legislative branches. 
V.  WHY IS THE CURRENT JUDICIAL  
PROCESS INADEQUATE TO CONSIDER  
THE EFFECT OF VCCR VIOLATIONS? 
An accused person in the United States has a right to a trial and 
a direct appeal of any conviction, whether prosecuted in federal or 
state court.  Although the federal government prosecutes some 
crimes, the vast majority of criminal trials occur in state courts.  Con-
sequently, much of the litigation raising VCCR violations is occurring 
as the result of state criminal prosecutions, and this section will focus 
on the procedures that pertain to a state prosecution.  In any state, an 
accused person will have a trial and a subsequent appeal to a state 
appellate court.  States also provide for state collateral review—
usually called state habeas corpus.  In addition, any person convicted 
in state court may seek collateral review by filing a petition for habeas 
corpus in federal court.  Federal habeas corpus is governed by a stat-
ute that was amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).57  With layers of review in both state and 
federal courts, why are the judicial procedures inadequate to guard 
against a miscarriage of justice with a VCCR violation? 
In many cases, the judicial procedures may be adequate if re-
viewed in a pretrial motion or on direct appeal.  The problem arises if 
the judicial procedure is one of federal habeas corpus.  The nature of 
collateral review through habeas corpus is limited in scope, access, 
and relief.  While federal habeas corpus is the last avenue of judicial 
proceedings for defendants, the likelihood of a court granting a writ is 
remote.  Why is that so?  The reasons are rooted in concerns for final-
ity and federalism.  There is a desire to have criminal proceedings end 
without continual legal challenges.  There is also a desire that federal 
courts not interfere with and, in fact, defer to the judgments of state 
courts even on issues of federal constitutional law.58  The result is that 
several restrictions on hearing federal habeas claims may result in an 
inability for the defendant to have his claim considered.  The primary 
 
 57. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). 
 58. See, e.g., Peter Hack, The Roads Less Traveled: Post-Conviction Relief Alternatives and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 30 AM. J. CRIM. L. 171, 176 (2003) 
(finality and federalism); Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and 
Proposed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2002). 
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restriction, though, that affects access to a hearing on the VCCR right 
is the procedural default doctrine.59 
How does the procedural default doctrine preclude a hearing on 
a claim?  In general, access to the federal courts through habeas cor-
pus is limited to those claims that were raised in state court so that 
state courts had a chance to rule on them.  If there is an adequate 
state procedural rule not to allow the defendant to raise a new claim, 
the defendant will usually be procedurally defaulted and barred from 
bringing it in federal court.60  There are two ways around procedural 
default from the case law: 1) cause and prejudice or 2) a fundamental 
miscarriage of justice that translates into innocence of the crime or 
ineligibility for the death penalty.61  These exceptions to procedural 
default are invoked sparingly. 
What has happened with the VCCR violations in the face of the 
procedural default doctrine?  Both the case of Angel Breard and the 
cases of the LaGrand brothers are good examples.  In neither situa-
tion was the VCCR claim raised until federal habeas corpus.  At that 
point, the federal courts found that the defendants were procedurally 
defaulted from raising the treaty claim in the habeas case.62  More-
over, the federal courts in Breard's case explicitly found that he had 
failed to establish cause and prejudice as an exception to procedural 
default.  The complete ignorance of his attorneys of the VCCR was 
inadequate "cause" because, according to the court, the treaty was in 
existence and accessible to the attorneys through legal research.63  As 
a result, the federal courts refused to consider the VCCR claim.  That 
meant that no court in the United States, state or federal, considered 
the effect of a violation of an international treaty on Breard's or the 
LaGrands' cases. 
 
 59. Other restrictions include the limitations on successive petitions, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) 
(2000); the standard for relief when a state court has ruled on the merits, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); 
and the requirements for a certificate of appealability to a federal circuit court, 28 U.S.C. § 
2253(c)(2).  Two other hurdles that do not completely deny access, but significantly impact relief 
in habeas proceedings are (1) the preclusion of an evidentiary hearing unless certain require-
ments are met under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(2), and (2) the harmless error doctrine.  Brecht v. 
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (whether the error “had substantial and injurious effect 
or influence in determining the jury's verdict”). 
 60. There is no specific rule in the habeas statute on procedural default.  As a result, its 
parameters are governed by case law.  See RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 26.1 (4th ed. 2001). 
 61. Id. 
 62. LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1261 (9th Cir. 1998); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 
(4th Cir. 1998). 
 63. Pruett, 134 F.3d at 619–20. 
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A recent Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision demonstrates 
the judicial confusion about the effect of an ICJ decision and the doc-
trine of procedural default.  Despite the decisions in LaGrand and 
Avena, holding that the treaty is violated if a doctrine such as proce-
dural default precludes hearing the claim, the Fifth Circuit found that 
the petitioner's case was procedurally defaulted because the VCCR 
claim was not raised in state court.  Although recognizing that the 
ICJ's judgments were to the contrary, the Fifth Circuit considered the 
United States Supreme Court's Breard decision to be controlling.64  In 
Breard, without the benefit of the ICJ's interpretation of the treaty, 
the Supreme Court had viewed procedural default as an appropriate 
procedure.65  The Fifth Circuit's decision could be distinguished as a 
failure by the court to appreciate the change in the law since La-
Grand.  However, the court's reticence to abide by the ICJ's decision 
is not unique.  Courts are typically not familiar with decisions from 
international tribunals, and there is debate over the significance of 
the decisions.66 
 
 64. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (Dec. 
10, 2004); cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (May 23, 2005).  See also Val-
dez v. State, 46 P.3d 703 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (finding foreign national petitioner proce-
durally defaulted on VCCR issue under state post-conviction rules based on reliance on Breard 
despite newer decision in LaGrand, although granting the petition on other grounds). 
 65. Breard, 523 U.S. at 375–77.  In the course of denying Breard's petition for certiorari, 
the Supreme Court commented in a per curiam opinion that Breard had procedurally defaulted 
his VCCR claim by not raising it in state court; that the VCCR provided for the rules of the re-
ceiving State to apply, which the Court thought included procedural default; that the 1996 
amendments to the habeas statute, which preclude an evidentiary hearing unless the claim is 
raised in state court, were later in time than the VCCR and thus, controlling; and that it was 
unlikely that Breard could have shown prejudice from the VCCR violation.  Id. at 375–76.  
However, because Breard preceded the ICJ's judgment in LaGrand, the Breard decision does 
not decide the issue of the effect of LaGrand or Avena on the application of the procedural de-
fault rule.  The Supreme Court assumed that, even with procedural default, the United States 
was giving "full effect" to the rights under the VCCR as required by the terms of the treaty.  See 
id. at 377 (asserting that Breard was better advised by his US attorney on his rights in the US 
than by the Paraguayan Consulate, and that it would be speculative to say that had his VCCR 
rights been respected, he would have pleaded guilty).  LaGrand rejected that assumption and 
found the opposite to be the case. 
 66. Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, No. 98-C1866, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20170 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2002) (finding that LaGrand was binding on the court, although 
deciding the case on other grounds) and Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442 (Okla. Crim. App. 
May 13, 2004) (Order Granting Stay of Execution and Remanding Case for Evidentiary Hear-
ing; hearing ordered to consider effect of VCCR violation and ineffective assistance of counsel) 
and J. Chapel, specially concurring (expressly stating that VCCR and decision of ICJ are bind-
ing on the court) with Commonwealth v. Diemer, 785 N.E.2d 1237 (Mass. App. Ct. 2003), cert. 
denied sub nom Diemer v. Massachusetts, 124 S. Ct. 1144 (2004) (noting that the effect of La-
Grand was "unclear"). 
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VI.  HOW TO BRING THE UNITED STATES  
INTO COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY:  
JUDICIAL, EXECUTIVE, AND LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Commentators have proposed various solutions to the failure to 
provide a review and reconsideration of a sentence and conviction 
when there is a VCCR violation.  The proposals include executive or-
ders, state legislation, congressional legislation creating a cause of ac-
tion, and federal lawsuits to force state compliance.67  These propos-
als deserve serious consideration and implementation in addition to 
any judicial decisions or revisions of the habeas corpus statute.  Re-
cent developments include both a possible judicial solution and a 
novel executive directive.  The judicial response might come from the 
United States Supreme Court, which accepted certiorari in December, 
2004, in a case raising the issue of compliance with the ICJ decisions 
in the courts.68  An executive attempt to resolve the compliance issue 
was revealed in the course of the litigation before the Supreme Court.  
In their amicus brief, the Justice Department cited a memorandum 
from the President to the Justice Department that states an executive 
determination to comply with the Avena decision.69  The Presidential 
memorandum is a determination "that the United States will dis-
charge its international obligations under the decisions of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice in . . . [Avena] by having state courts give effect 
to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in 
cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision."70  
Amending the habeas statute, however, is also a logical solution re-
 
 67. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The Constitutional Authority of the Federal Government 
in State Criminal Proceedings that Involve U.S. Treaty Obligations or Affect U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions, 10 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 4–7 (1999) (positing both congressional legislation and 
executive action that would provide avenues to require states to comply with a treaty even if it 
affects a state criminal proceeding); John Quigley, The Law of State Responsibility and the Right 
to Consular Access, 11 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DIS. RESOL. 39, 51 (2004) (referring to the 
possibility of executive action or enforcement through a lawsuit brought by the Justice Depart-
ment to compel a state to comply with the treaty in a criminal case); Joshua A. Brook, Note, 
Federalism and Foreign Affairs: How to Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention and Obey 
the U.S. Constitution, Too, 37 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 573 (2004) (suggesting judicial, executive, and 
legislative remedies). 
 68. Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 686 (Dec. 10, 
2004); cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 125 S.Ct. 2088 (May 23, 2005).  See Postscript, 
infra at notes 93-98 and accompanying text, for a brief summary of the Court's reasons for dis-
missing certiorari and the dissenting views. 
 69. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 41–42, Medel-
lin v. Dretke, 73 U.S.L.W. 3350 (U.S. Dec. 10, 2004) (No. 04-5928). 
 70. Id. 
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gardless of the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court or the 
effect of the President's memorandum.  The judicial and executive 
approaches currently underway may prove to be only partial solutions 
or may leave open legal questions that could be answered more com-
pletely with legislative action.  As the primary vehicle for post-
conviction relief, the habeas statute should be amended to resolve the 
controversy and to make it clear that federal courts must review a 
VCCR violation even in a situation where the claim would ordinarily 
be procedurally defaulted. 
A judicial resolution of compliance with the VCCR is uncertain.  
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case of Medel-
lin v. Dretke, the case from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dis-
cussed earlier, in which the Fifth Circuit found that Medellin's VCCR 
claim was procedurally defaulted, the substantive and procedural is-
sues in the case are complicated.  As a result, it is difficult to know if 
the Court will resolve all of the aspects of compliance with the treaty.  
The heart of the substantive dispute is whether the interpretation of 
the treaty by the ICJ is the operable law in U.S. courts.  If it is, then 
there must be a review and reconsideration of the VCCR claims re-
gardless of the procedural default doctrine.  The Court accepted cer-
tiorari on two questions, both of which raise substantive legal theories 
for applying the Avena decision in U.S. courts.  The first question is 
based on a direct application of the Avena decision.71  The second 
question is based on giving effect to the decision as a matter of comity 
and uniform treaty interpretation.72  Both theories are contested by 
Texas.  The labyrinth of disputed procedural issues in Medellin in-
cludes the standards under the habeas statute for granting a certifi-
cate of appealability (COA) and whether the Court should stay or 
dismiss the case in light of the President's memorandum. 
The substantive dispute between Medellin and Texas is particu-
larly complex because it involves both a treaty and a decision from an 
international tribunal interpreting the treaty.  Medellin argues that 
the VCCR, as a self-executing treaty, is binding on the United States, 
including the state and federal courts, under the Supremacy Clause of 
the U.S. Constitution.73  They further assert that because the United 
States has agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and to the binding na-
ture of the ICJ decisions, the ICJ decision applies in U.S. courts in the 
 
 71. Reply Brief for Petitioner at i, Medellin (No. 04-5928). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 4–6. 
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same manner as would the treaty itself.74  Medellin further claims that 
there is an individual right under the treaty that can be raised in fed-
eral habeas corpus as the federal statute refers to rights under a 
treaty, as well as under the Constitution or federal laws.75  Texas and 
the United States, as an amicus curiae, counter that the obligation to 
comply with decisions of the ICJ is only enforceable through the Se-
curity Council of the United Nations.76  They take the position that 
the Avena decision does not impose a judicially enforceable right un-
der U.S. law.77 
In addition to the contested substantive issues, Medellin has be-
come a procedural quagmire.  In their brief, Texas raised the issue of 
the standards for granting a COA, a necessary prerequisite to an ap-
peal from a denial of habeas corpus.  Texas claims that the Fifth Cir-
cuit appropriately declined to issue the certificate.78  Although the 
questions on which certiorari was accepted are not couched in terms 
of the COA, the underlying procedural posture is a denial of the 
COA.  The COA issue, however, is inextricably intertwined with the 
substantive issues as the certificate should issue "only if the applicant 
has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional 
right."79  The focus on the substance of the denial brings the question 
back to whether the Avena decision is the operable law.  If Avena is 
the controlling law, then arguably Medellin has established the "sub-
stantial showing," and a COA should have issued.  This procedural 
posture is even further complicated by the parties' dispute over 
whether the statute's language regarding a denial of a "constitu-
tional" right includes or excludes a "treaty" right.80  With the revela-
tion of the President's memorandum, however, the procedural issues 
have shifted to whether the Court should grant a stay of the proceed-
ings, dismiss certiorari as improvidently granted, or proceed to the 
 
 74. Brief for Petitioner at 36–37.  Note, however, that the United States has since with-
drawn from the Optional Protocol that agreed to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.  See supra text ac-
companying note 20. 
 75. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 8–9. 
 76. Respondent's Brief at 33–35; Brief for the United States at 35. 
 77. Respondent's Brief at 32–33; Brief for the United States at 33. 
 78. Respondent's Brief at 8–9. 
 79. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (2) (2000). 
 80. Texas argues that only constitutional issues may be appealed, which precludes raising 
the VCCR claim on appeal.  Respondent's Brief at 9–10.  Petitioner responds that the issue is 
not properly before the Court, Petitoner's Reply Brief at 16–18, and that the statute should be 
interpreted to include treaty claims on appeal.  Id. at 20–26. 
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merits.  Medellin has moved for a stay,81 and the Justice Department 
claims that only the President can decide on compliance with a 
treaty.82  Texas, on the other hand, wants the Court to proceed to the 
merits of the case and affirm the Fifth Circuit's denial of the COA.83  
In an interesting twist, Texas and the Justice Department appear to 
be at odds over the legitimacy of the President's authority to require 
the Texas state courts to conduct a hearing.84 
With the complex issues and the advent of the President's memo-
randum, one of the underlying substantive issues in Medellin is receiv-
ing less attention, but is still a critical element of the case.  If the 
Avena decision applies in U.S. courts, there is a potential conflict be-
tween the ICJ's finding that the treaty is violated if procedural rules 
bar a hearing and the usual application of the procedural default doc-
trine to bar claims in habeas cases.  The Fifth Circuit relied on the 
Supreme Court's decision in Breard, in which the Court indicated that 
the procedural default doctrine prevails over the treaty.  In their 
briefs, the parties in Medellin address the viability of the Breard case 
in light of the subsequent decisions from the ICJ in LaGrand and 
Avena.  Medellin argues that Breard is either distinguishable because 
it preceded the ICJ cases or should be overruled.  Medellin contends 
that the subsequent LaGrand and Avena cases made clear that the 
United States is not giving full effect to the consular notification 
rights as required under the treaty if the procedural default rule pre-
cludes a hearing on the effect of a VCCR violation.85 Texas argues in 
response that the Supreme Court's position in Breard still stands.  
Texas contends that the amended federal habeas statute was passed 
subsequent to the treaty, is "last in time" and, therefore, is the con-
trolling law.86  One of the amicus briefs for Medellin counters with the 
general principle that the Court should attempt to reconcile a poten-
tially conflicting treaty and statute.87 
There are at least three possible ways in which to reconcile the 
obligations under the treaty as interpreted by Avena and the proce-
dural default doctrine.  One possible reconciliation would be to allow 
 
 81. Motion for Stay, filed March 8, 2005. 
 82. Brief for the United States at 41–45. 
 83. Response to Petitioner's Motion to Stay at 7. 
 84. Brief for the United States at 41; Response to Petitioner's Motion to Stay at 4–5 (Presi-
dent's authority is unclear). 
 85. Brief for Petitioner at 42–45. 
 86. Respondent's Brief at 10–11. 
 87. Brief of International Law Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 7–8. 
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an exception to the procedural default doctrine, as the Court has 
found with a showing of either cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of 
justice.  A second reconciliation approach would acknowledge that 
the procedural default rule is not part of the habeas statute; instead it 
is a judicial doctrine.  If the doctrine is not codified, there is arguably 
no statute to contradict the treaty, and the treaty provisions would be 
controlling.  Yet a third possibility is that, even if procedural default is 
viewed as part of the statutory scheme for habeas corpus, the judi-
cially-created doctrine predates the amendments and the treaty or its 
most recent interpretations.  Any of these approaches would provide 
for a review and reconsideration of a VCCR claim as required by the 
treaty and still preserve in general the doctrine of procedural default. 
Even if the Supreme Court or the President's memorandum pro-
vide that a hearing on VCCR violations must be conducted despite a 
procedural default, it would be helpful for clarity and future cases to 
have Congress amend the habeas statute to provide expressly for a 
hearing in a VCCR context.  This is especially true in light of the dis-
pute between Texas and the Justice Department over the legality of 
the President's determination and the likelihood that the Supreme 
Court will not resolve all of the substantive and procedural issues in 
the Medellin case.  Moreover, the President's memorandum only cov-
ers the fifty-one cases of the Mexican nationals at issue in Avena.  The 
Justice Department brief clearly states that, in their view, the merits 
of the legal issues may still be litigated in future cases.88  Thus, even 
the executive approach does not resolve the applicability of the 
VCCR and the ICJ decisions in the cases of other foreign nationals on 
death row.  Although the procedural default doctrine is not directly 
embodied in the federal statute and its parameters are defined by 
case law, there is a revision to a section of the statute that could rem-
edy the current problem.  Section 2254 precludes the grant of a writ 
unless the applicant has exhausted state remedies.89  Procedural de-
fault occurs when the applicant has exhausted state remedies, but can 
no longer go into a state court to have a hearing on the claim.  Section 
2254(b)(1) should be amended to add a third subsection (C) [new ma-
terial in bold] so that the full section would read: 
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be 
granted unless it appears that— 
 
 88. Brief for the United States at 47–48. 
 89. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). 
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(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in 
the courts of the State; 
(B) or (i) there is an absence of available State corrective 
process; or 
(ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffec-
tive to protect the rights of the applicant. 
(C) or the applicant is raising a claim, whether or not raised 
in state court, that is based on the Constitution or laws 
or treaties of the United States, and which requires a 
hearing, or review and reconsideration of the convic-
tion and sentence, on the alleged violation. 
With this amendment, individuals would be able to gain access to fed-
eral habeas corpus either through exhausting state remedies first or 
through basing a claim on a law that requires a hearing or review.  
This new provision would not eliminate the requirement of exhaus-
tion of state remedies because subsection (C) would only apply in 
those situations where such a hearing or review was required by law.  
Nor would the amendment eliminate procedural default as a limiting 
device in most habeas cases.  By allowing a hearing under limited cir-
cumstances, however, even when the issue was not raised in state 
court, individuals in the situation of Breard, the LaGrands, or Medel-
lin would be able to have a federal court hear their VCCR claims de-
spite failing to raise the VCCR violation in state court.90  The United 
States would be one step closer to compliance with its treaty obliga-
tion under the ICJ's interpretation of the VCCR. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The continuing dialogue on compliance with the VCCR is impor-
tant in its own right and also for the insights this debate provides into 
post-conviction proceedings in the United States.  As the ICJ found in 
 
 90. Other provisions of the habeas statute would also need to be amended to allow for an 
evidentiary hearing, 28 U.S. C. § 2254(e)(2), and a successive petition, 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b)(2).  
As presently written, § 2254(e)(2) precludes evidentiary hearings unless one of two exceptions is 
met, either "(A)(i) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral re-
view by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; or (ii) a factual predicate that 
could not have been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence; and (B) the 
facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that 
but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of 
the underlying offense."  Those exceptions are the same as the exceptions for successive peti-
tions.  Both provisions should be amended to include a third situation permitting an evidentiary 
hearing and a successive petition for a VCCR violation with language such as: "Or (3) a claim 
not previously raised that is based upon a violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States, which requires a hearing, or review and reconsideration of the conviction and 
sentence, on the alleged violation." 
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Avena, clemency is an inadequate forum for review and reconsidera-
tion of rights under the VCCR.  Justice Blackmun, quoted at the be-
ginning of this paper, similarly identified the unregulated nature of 
clemency as problematic in the enforcement of a constitutional 
right.91  The vindication of a right, whether guaranteed by the Consti-
tution or a treaty, cannot be dependent on the unregulated, unre-
viewable, nonjudicial process of clemency.  And yet, the current judi-
cial processes in the United States are likely to be inadequate if the 
issue is raised in federal habeas corpus.  Justice Stevens, also quoted 
at the beginning of this paper, stated that the use of a preclusionary 
doctrine in the context of a VCCR violation is "manifestly unfair."92  
There is a manifest injustice in failing to provide a judicial forum for a 
review of a treaty violation and its impact on the trial.  The ICJ clari-
fied in Avena that the VCCR requires a judicial review and reconsid-
eration.  The inadequacies of clemency and federal habeas corpus 
proceedings in this context should be a starting point for reevaluating 
post-conviction relief in the United States and its efficacy in providing 
fundamental fairness in our criminal justice system. 
POSTSCRIPT 
On May 23, 2005, as this essay was about to be printed, the Court 
issued a per curiam opinion dismissing certiorari as improvidently 
granted in the Medellin case.93  The dismissal was not unexpected 
given the unusual posture of the case and President Bush's memoran-
dum directing state courts to hear the VCCR claims of the Mexican 
nationals in Avena.94  Nevertheless, the dismissal was a close 5 to 4 
decision.  Four of the justices would have preferred to stay the pro-
ceedings in the Supreme Court pending the outcome in the state 
court habeas action.  In the absence of a majority for a stay, one of 
the four justices opted to provide the fifth vote for a dismissal (Gins-
berg), while the other three justices joined the dissent of Justice 
O'Connor (Souter, Breyer, and Stevens).95  Justice O'Connor's dis-
sent took the position that denial of the certificate of appealability by 
the Fifth Circuit should be vacated and the case remanded to that 
 
 91. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 92. Torres v. Mullin, 124 S. Ct. 919, 919 (2003) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certio-
rari). 
 93. 125 S.Ct. 2088 (2005). 
 94. See discussion infra, notes 69-84 and accompanying text. 
 95. 125 S.Ct. at 2093 (Ginsberg, J., concurring); id. at 16 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 17 (Breyer, 
J., dissenting, joined by Justice Stevens). 
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court to decide the issues or to hold the case until the state court pro-
ceedings were completed.96  Justice Souter alone, in his dissent, would 
have decided the issues on which certiorari was granted as an alterna-
tive to a stay or a remand.97  It is likely that the case will eventually be 
back before the Supreme Court.98  At this time, however, any judicial 
responses to VCCR violations will occur in the lower courts.  A judi-
cial solution to the violations of the VCCR, thus, remains unsettled 
and a legislative response would provide a more timely resolution of 
compliance with the treaty. 
 
 
 96. Id. at 2105 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 2106 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 98. Id. at 2090, n.1 (Court will "in all likelihood have an opportunity" to review the case if Medel-
lin or Texas seek certiorari after state court proceedings); id. at 2093 (Ginsberg, J., concurring) (joining 
per curiam opinion, "recognizing that this Court would have jurisdiction to review the final judgment in 
the Texas proceedings . . . ."). 
